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Abstract: Data published by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office show that over the last 
fifty  years  expenditures  for  infrastructure’s  operations  and  maintenance  (O&M)  have 
roughly equalled those for new capital. We use this dataset to investigate the productive 
impact  of  public  infrastructure  spending  taking  into  account  its  composition  for  each 
government  level.  We  find  that  a  rise  (fall)  in  infrastructure  expenditures  by  states  and 
localities (the federal government) would enhance future productivity growth and that the 
rise in state and local spending should mainly come from additional O&M outlays in the 
transport sector. 
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"…urban planners and infrastructure experts say the deterioration of the area’s roads is 
also the result of shortsighted policy decisions by state government officials who have often 
been more eager to build new highways than repair existing streets." 
 
(New York Times, 26 July 2009: Many Failing Roads, Little Repair Money) 
 
1. Introduction 
A  number  of  recent  policy  reports  have  stressed  the  need  for  increased  infrastructure 
spending in the U.S. in order to enhance long-run productivity growth. The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) has stated that an increased infrastructure investment of $184.8 billion 
would  be  ‘economically  justifiable’  (CBO,  2008,  Table  2).  The  National  Surface 
Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission’s (2008) report has recommended an 
investment of $225 billion to $340 billion annually across all modes of surface transportation 
to maintain and upgrade the system. Similarly, a study by the National Chamber Foundation 
(2005)  has  estimated  that  to  maintain  the  current  condition  of  the  nation’s  pavements, 
bridges, and transit infrastructure, an expenditure by all levels of government of $222 billion 
($125  billion  in  capital  investment  and  $97  billion  for  operations  and  maintenance)  was 
needed in 2005. Moreover, to improve highways and transit systems, an investment of $356 
billion -expected to “have a positive benefit/cost ratio and improve the productivity of the U.S. 
economy”- is required by 2015. 
The goal of the present paper is twofold. First, we aim at investigating the role of public 
infrastructure  spending  in  U.S.  private  productivity  growth  by  assessing  the  impact  of 
capital versus operations and maintenance (O&M) outlays, with the latter broadly defined as 
the  “…employment  of  resources  […]  that  preserve  the  operative  state  of  capital”  (Bitros,  1976, 
p.919). Our paper therefore addresses a central and timely topic, left unexplored in existing 
studies on the determinants of U.S. productivity, namely whether the marginal dollar on 
public infrastructure should be spent for capital or O&M.   2 
Moreover, given that in the U.S. the responsibility for providing public capital is shared 
across all levels of government, an important question is by whom this dollar should be 
spent. Conceptually, the rationale for why decentralization of infrastructure expenditures 
may affect productivity could be through the improvement of allocative efficiency, like better 
distribution of public services, or productive efficiency by providing infrastructure services 
at a lower cost. Standard public-finance theory suggests that local public goods, like many 
infrastructural  projects,  can  be  more  efficiently  provided  at  the  regional  level  as  a 
manifestation of the Tiebout hypothesis. As discussed in Estache and Sinha (1995), in various 
sectors of local economic activity, like urban transit, water supply and road maintenance, in 
which there is little scope for economies of scale, decentralization is the most effective way to 
deliver  service.1  In  turn,  a  large  empirical  literature  has  explored  the  decentralization 
question, namely whether a reallocation of public spending from the central to lower levels 
of government would have a favorable effect on economic outcomes (see, among others, 
Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Xie et al., 1999; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 
2005; Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005; Thornton, 2007). The second goal of the paper is therefore 
to assess the relative contribution of capital and O&M outlays by the federal government 
compared to those by states and localities.  
Up to now, one of the main reasons for the lack of any systematic empirical investigation 
on the productive role of public capital maintenance by government level has been the non-
availability of reliable and consistent data on the time pattern of O&M expenditures, as well 
as on their financing sources. Recently, a policy report by CBO (2007) has provided detailed 
time-series data for public spending on transportation and water infrastructure in the U.S. 
                                                 
1 We thank a referee for pointing out to us this paper.   3 
since  1956  along  with  an  extensive  documentation.  This  unique  dataset  distinguishes 
between federal and state and local expenditures, and also between spending for capital and 
O&M.  According  to  the  evidence,  the  average  size  of  total  public-sector  spending  on 
infrastructure has been around 2.6 percent of GDP with the share of O&M expenditures 
amounting to 49 percent of total. The special emphasis of our study on the role of O&M 
spending can therefore be justified by the simple stylized fact that it has roughly equalled 
capital expenditures in the U.S. over the last fifty years. It is also of interest to note the 
heterogeneous  allocation  of  these  expenditures  between  the  two  government  levels. 
Spending for infrastructure capital and related O&M by the federal government and states 
and  localities  has  on  average  amounted  to  0.7  percent  of  GDP  and  1.9  percent  of  GDP, 
respectively, with only 25 percent of federal infrastructure spending directed towards O&M. 
In  contrast, the corresponding  share  by  states and  localities  has on  average  exceeded  58 
percent.  
Using this new dataset for the U.S. we are able to estimate the effects on future private 
productivity  growth  for  both  components  of  infrastructure  spending  and  for  each 
government level separately. It should be underscored at this point that the assessment of 
the productive impact of capital and O&M expenditures is conducted here at the aggregate, 
rather than say the industrial, level. This aggregation is important because of the associated 
economic  and  spatial  synergies  and  spillovers generated  by  government  interventions in 
areas like transportation and water. The marginal value of individual projects in these sectors 
is more likely to show up in national aggregates, like the private productivity growth rate.  
The  main  findings  of  the  paper  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  The  U.S.  private 
productivity growth rate would not be substantially affected at the margin by a change in 
total government spending for infrastructure capital and O&M or by a reallocation between   4 
these two components. Yet, a disaggregated inspection shows that a ceteris paribus increase in 
infrastructure outlays by the federal government would have a negative effect on future 
productivity growth. In contrast, a rise of spending by states and localities, and particularly 
of O&M outlays, would have a positive effect. Our results coincide with the views expressed 
by, among others, Hulten and Schwab (1997) who have stressed that state and local under-
spending  on  infrastructure  may  occur  if  the  presence  of  spillover  benefits  from  one 
jurisdiction into another is ignored. The evidence presented here thus sheds some further 
light  in  the  decentralization  question  by  showing  that  decentralization  of  infrastructure 
spending, and mainly of its O&M component, contributes to future productivity growth. In 
particular, our findings extend those of Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005), who have found 
that  Canada  overspends  on  total  infrastructure  and  on  maintenance,  and  Ghosh  and 
Gregoriou  (2008)  who  proxy  O&M  spending  by  the  component  of  current  expenditures 
labelled ‘other purchases in goods and services’ in World Bank data, and show in a panel of 
developing countries that these expenditures have exerted a positive impact on per capita 
growth. The current paper shares a similar methodology with these studies and finds that 
overall total spending on public infrastructure is about at the right level. Yet, our results also 
show that decentralizing infrastructure expenditures from the federal government to states 
and localities may increase productivity growth and that states and localities under-spend on 
O&M. Our sectoral analysis also indicates that state and local expenditures on transportation 
should increase and be directed towards O&M. The analysis is in line with the view that 
infrastructure maintenance is mainly a local task due to greater efficiency in identifying and 
dealing with maintenance requirements. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the U.S. data on 
public spending for infrastructure capital and related O&M. Section 3 outlines the empirical   5 
strategy and section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 provides empirical evidence 
for the transportation sector and, finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The CBO (2007) dataset on U.S. public infrastructure spending  
The CBO (2007) report provides a detailed dataset that covers capital and O&M spending on 
U.S. transportation and water infrastructure at the federal level from 1956 to 2006 and at the 
state  and  local  level  from  1956  to  2004.  Corresponding  series  come  from  the  Office  of 
Management and Budget and the Bureau of the Census, respectively, and are available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publications/bysubject.cfm?cat=21.  The  data  refer  to  highways  and 
roads, mass transit, rail, aviation, water transportation, water resources, and water supply 
and wastewater treatment, which produce services under public funding and management 
that broadly facilitate private economic activity. These sectors have been typically examined 
by  several  studies,  initiated  by  Aschauer  (1989),  that  have  attempted  to  estimate  the 
productivity  gains  stemming  from  an  increase  in  U.S.  public  infrastructure.2  A  second 
advantage of the present dataset is its budgetary nature, which circumvents several of the 
inherent difficulties associated with the measurement of public capital stocks, like ad hoc 
assumptions on the service life of public capital assets.3  
Expenditures  “for  the  purchase,  construction,  rehabilitation,  and  improvement  of  physical 
infrastructure” are defined as capital spending, while expenditures that are “required to provide 
the services needed for infrastructure to function and are necessary for the repair and safe operation of 
                                                 
2 For a survey, see Romp and de Haan (2007). 
3 The figures provided here can therefore be considered as proxies for gross public capital formation, 
because they embed additions to the capital stock and replacement of depreciated capital brought 
about by wear and tear of used infrastructure. Still, the CBO (2007) report recognizes that these figures 
do not include expenses incurred through the depreciation of the infrastructure that is part of the cost 
of providing those services.   6 
existing infrastructure” comprise O&M spending.4 Federal capital outlays include all reported 
investment  spending  on  physical  infrastructure  assets,  such  as  construction  and 
rehabilitation,  purchase  and  sales  of  land  and  structures,  and  major  equipment.  The 
remaining investment spending in nonphysical infrastructure assets, such as research and 
development, education and training, and other noninvestment activities, comprises federal 
O&M  spending.  Turning  to  state  and  local  spending,  capital  outlays  cover  construction, 
purchase of land, existing structures, and equipment, whereas O&M outlays cover current 
operations.5 
Table  1  gives  a  synoptic  presentation  of  the  main  statistics  for  capital  and  O&M 
expenditures by government level, taking account their allocation between transportation 
and water infrastructure over the period 1956-2004. The general picture shows that total 
government spending on infrastructure has fluctuated between 2.3 percent and 3.1 percent of 
GDP  with  the  average  O&M  share  covering  around  49  percent.  However,  there  are 
substantial  differences  between  the  two  government  levels.  States  and  localities  have 
accounted for roughly three-quarters of total government spending and have been devoting 
                                                 
4 Only scant estimates on the magnitude of these expenditures exist in the literature. Yepes (2004) 
estimates that infrastructure maintenance in East Asian countries amounted to 2.2 percent of GDP 
over the period 1996-2005, covering roughly 30 percent of total capital expenditures. The only relevant 
long-run  data  source  is  the  Canadian  survey  on  ‘Capital  and  Repair  Expenditures’  by  Statistics 
Canada,  which  shows  that  total  public  capital  maintenance  and  repair  expenditures  in  Canada 
amounted on average to 1.5 percent of GDP for the period 1956-93 and comprised 21 percent of total 
public  capital  spending.  However,  the  figures  from  the  U.S.  and  the  Canadian  datasets  are  not 
comparable,  because  Statistics  Canada  simply  reports  expenditures  by  government-owned 
enterprises, government institutions-housing, and government departments, in which the government 
controls  more  than  50  percent  of  the  voting  rights;  apart  from  ‘pure’  public  services,  such  as 
departments or their equivalents, this definition also covers other organizations, which operate more 
independently.  The  Canadian  survey  does  not  classify  these  expenditures  by  sector  of  economic 
activity and hence is not informative regarding the productive nature of these outlays. 
5 The  determination of each of these categories is given in the  Bureau of the  Census,  Government 
Finance  and  Employment  Classification  Manual  For  a  detailed  description  of  the  distinction  between 
capital and O&M expenditures, see also Appendix B, Web Supplement to Trends in Public Spending 
on  Transportation  and  Water  Infrastructure,  1956  to  2004  (available  at   7 
the  largest  portion  of  this  spending  (close  to  60  percent)  to  O&M.  In  contrast,  the  vast 
majority of federal outlays (close to 75 percent) have been targeted at providing new capital 
(see  also  Figures  3  to  5  in  CBO,  2007).  Table  2  summarizes  the  correlation  coefficients 
between  the  main  components  of  aggregate  public  capital  and  O&M  spending  by 
government level. 
We close this section by noting that, as pointed out by Holtz-Eakin (1993), during the 
post-war period the federal government provided strong incentives for new investment via 
matching grants, which is likely to have resulted in maintenance under-spending by states 
and localities. Yet, it is often hard to disentangle the financing sources of infrastructure, as 
several  projects  in  the  U.S.  states  and  communities  are  funded  by  federal  grants  with  a 
requirement for matching funds. Co-financing of infrastructure projects by higher and lower 
tiers of authorities has been usually justified as a means of internalising spillover effects (see 
e.g. Oates, 1999). For example, the Interstate Highway System was co-financed by the FHWA 
(90 percent) and matching state funds via the Department of Transportation (10 percent). Yet, 
as pointed out by several case studies, after the completion of the Interstate Highway System 
in the 70s transportation issues have increasingly become local in nature. 6  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
A large number of empirical papers on the policy determinants of economic activity have 
examined  the  role  of  government  activities  for  the  improvement  of  long-term  economic 
performance  and  its  key  engine,  productivity  growth.7  Following  this  line  of research,  a 
strand of the literature has focused on the decomposition of public expenditures in order to 
                                                                                                                                                         
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/85xx/doc8517/WebAppendix.pdf). 
6 For a fiscal-federalism approach to infrastructure policy in the U.S., see Hulten and Schwab (1997).   8 
identify  the  impacts  of  individual  categories  on  productivity  growth.  In  particular, 
Devarajan et al. (1996), Kneller et al. (1999), and Bleaney et al. (2001) have classified public 
investment  expenditures  into  ‘productive’  and  ‘unproductive’  expenditures  based  on  the 
sectoral activity involved, and have confirmed that their impact differs dramatically with 
‘productive’ expenditures exerting a positive influence on growth, whereas ‘unproductive’ 
ones have virtually no impact.  
Up  to  now,  there  has  not  been  a  systematic  attempt  to  empirically  investigate  the 
productive  impact  of  O&M  expenditures  on  public  infrastructure,  despite  the  intuitive 
consensus on their crucial weight and the apparent trade-off with outlays aiming at public 
capital formation.8 In this paper, based on Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005) and Ghosh and 
Gregoriou  (2008),  we develop  a  time-series framework  that relates  the  capital  and O&M 
components  of  infrastructure  spending  to  U.S.  private  productivity  growth.  More 
specifically, we aim at examining the links between public infrastructure expenditures as a 
share of GDP, the corresponding O&M share in these expenditures, and future productivity 
growth. For instance, a positive (negative) impact of capital and O&M expenditures scaled to 
GDP on productivity growth indicates that a rise (fall) of these expenditures as a share of 
GDP would ceteris paribus enhance (reduce) future private productivity growth. In a similar 
vein, a positive effect of the O&M spending share on productivity growth would imply that 
a reallocation of government expenditures towards O&M would increase future productivity 
growth. The estimated equation takes the general parametric form: 
                                                                                                                                                         
7 See Gramlich (1994) and Gemmel and Kneller (2001) for extensive surveys. 
8  Rioja  (2003),  Kalaitzidakis  and  Kalyvitis  (2004),  and  Dioikitopoulos  and  Kalyvitis  (2008)  have 
developed theoretical models that investigate the positive externalities of these expenditures arising 
through  endogenous  public  capital  depreciation  and  the  associated  implications  for  growth.  The 
impact of maintenance expenditures on public capital is usually assessed in the context of cost-benefit 
analysis  and  is  primarily  concerned  with  road  damage  and  optimal  user  charges,  which  rely  on   9 
 
( ) ,
f US G OM OM
productivity growth g f
Y G OM
+   = ⋅ +   +  
  (1) 
 
where 
f US growth ty productivi  denotes the measure of future private productivity growth (see 
below for a more detailed discussion),  ) (⋅ g  is a set of controls, G and OM respectively denote 
capital and O&M spending on public infrastructure, and Y denotes output. Hence,  Y
OM G+  
refers to capital and O&M expenditures as a share of GDP, and  OM G
OM
+  refers to the share of 
O&M  spending  in  these  expenditures. Given  the  heterogeneous  allocation  of  capital  and 
O&M expenditures between the two government levels, equation (1) is estimated both for 
total government expenditures and for federal and state and local spending separately in 
order to assess potential differences in the productive impacts.  
We  use  as  the  dependent  variable  the  five-year  forward  moving  average  of  the 
productivity growth rate, in order to avoid potential endogeneity problems (Devarajan et al., 
1996; Kalyvitis and Kalaitzidakis, 2005; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008); this definition captures 
the impact of lagged public expenditures and dampens down the business-cycle effect on 
productivity  growth.9  To  account  for  the  presence  of  overlapping  observations  and  the 
associated serial correlation of the residuals, which renders estimation methods like OLS 
inappropriate, estimation is carried via an asymptotically efficient Generalized Method of 
Moments  estimator  that  is  robust  to  autocorrelation,  with  a  correction  for  fourth-order 
moving-average autocorrelation in the weighting matrix.  
In  turn,  we  employ  two  alternative  measures  of  long-run  U.S.  private  productivity 
                                                                                                                                                         
required repairs and their timing; see Newberry (1988).  
9 We experimented with the percentage change between t+5 and t+1 growth rate and the three-year 
forward moving average, but the main results were not affected.    10 
provided for the non-farm private business sector by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
The first measure utilizes the traditional aspect of labor productivity, namely output per 
hour, whereas the second measure covers multifactor productivity, which also accounts for 
the role of capital growth in output growth. We include two main variables to control for 
other effects on the U.S. private productivity growth rate. First, a technology index, based on 
Fernald (2010), is used to account for changes in technology and variable factor utilization 
along the business cycle (hoarding) following Basu et al. (2006). This effect becomes more 
important in the present setup, since capital hoarding is likely to affect the magnitude of 
O&M  expenditures  as  well  as  their  productive  impact.  Second,  the  GDP  share  of  total 
government revenues is included as a measure of the domestic fiscal stance, which is likely 
to influence the productivity impact of infrastructure expenditures.10 
 
4. Estimation results 
 
4.1. Primal findings 
Table  3  presents  the  results  for  our  first  set  of  regressions  that  estimate  linear  effects  of 
infrastructure expenditures (capital and O&M) on future U.S. private productivity growth 
separately for total government, federal government, and states and localities. 11 With respect 
to the control variables, the technology index enters with a negative sign that is generally 
statistically  significant,  whereas  the  coefficient  on  revenues  is  positive  and  statistically 
                                                 
10 See the Data Appendix for further details on the explanatory variables. Other potential explanatory 
variables routinely included in aggregate productivity studies are the levels of R&D expenditures, 
human  capital  and  trade  openness.  However,  none  of  these  variables  entered  with  a  significant 
coefficient in the estimated regressions, probably due to the relatively short horizon (5-year) measure 
of future productivity utilized here. 
11 Standard Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests were performed for all the variables at 
hand. The optimal lag was found to be of second or third order in all regressions and the results 
(available upon request) indicated that all variables are stationary.   11 
significant. Turning to the variables of interest, we observe that they are not significant in the 
regressions  with  expenditures  by  total  government. Re-estimating  the  specifications with 
expenditures by the federal government only, we find statistically significant negative effects 
at the 1% level for both variables of interest. According to the estimated coefficients, a fall of 
federal capital and O&M expenditures as a share of output by one percentage point would 
raise the productivity growth rate by roughly 0.02 percentage points. Similarly, a reallocation 
of  federal  spending  towards  capital  spending  by  increasing  its  share  by  ten  percentage 
points  (say  from  50%  to  60%  of  total  spending)  would  ceteris  paribus  raise  productivity 
growth by roughly 0.009 percentage points. The picture turns opposite when it comes to 
estimating  the  effects  of  state  and  local  spending,  as  we  get  positive  and  significant 
coefficients at the 1% level for capital and O&M expenditures and insignificant coefficients for 
the O&M share in both specifications. The productivity gains are here much larger: a rise of 
state  and  local  spending  in  capital  and  O&M  expenditures  as  a  share  of  output  by  one 
percentage point would raise the productivity growth rate by roughly 0.04 percentage points 
Next, we further investigate the above results by including in our regressions second-
order effects of the two main explanatory variables, as in Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005), 
to  account  for  potential  nonlinearities  in  the  relationship  under  investigation.12  Table  4 
reports  the  results  for  this  second  set  of  regressions,  again  for  each  government  level 
separately.  The  general  picture  with  respect  to  the  control  variables  remains  unaltered. 
Focusing  on  the  two  main  explanatory  variables,  first  in  the  case  of  total  government 
                                                 
12  Potential  nonlinearities  are  taken  into  account  for  two  reasons.  First,  at  relatively  low  levels of 
spending the marginal productivity-growth effects of total expenditures are likely to be positive, but 
the relationship may become negative, when they get relatively large as a manifestation of the Barro 
(1990)  standard  inverse  U-shaped  effect.  Second,  O&M  expenditures  are  expected  to  operate  by 
affecting mainly the service life and, consequently, the depreciation rate of public infrastructure. This 
relationship is likely to be nonlinear in the presence of a standard convex depreciation technology. We 
also considered including multiplicative terms or higher-order effects of two main variables in our   12 
spending the regression results are improved, since for capital and O&M expenditures the first- 
and second-order effects become highly significant. The same holds for the O&M share, for 
which the first- and second-order effects (negative and positive signs, respectively) are as 
well  significant.  These  results  indicate  that  the  relationships  under  investigation  are 
nonlinear. To assess the marginal impacts of the two variables of interest, the corresponding 
derivatives  are  calculated  at  the  means  of  the  variables  and  a  standard  Wald  test  is 
performed.  The  results,  summarized  in  the  lower  part  of  Table  4,  suggest  again  that 
additional total government expenditures on infrastructure, as well as a reallocation between 
their  capital  and  O&M  components,  would  not  affect  future  productivity  growth  (zero 
marginal  effects).  This  finding  may  well  be  related  to  the  broad  definition  of  total 
government  expenditures  covered  here,  which  include  both  federal  and  state  and  local 
spending  that  could  be  operating  in  opposite  directions  regarding  their  effects  on 
productivity growth.  
To further explore this issue we turn to the evidence from regressions with federal or 
state and local spending. The coefficients on capital and O&M expenditures and its square term 
turn out  insignificant, whereas the  first-  and second-order  effects for the  O&M  share  are 
found to be negative and positive respectively, and statistically significant in specifications 
with federal spending. Interestingly, the marginal effects of capital and O&M expenditures and 
the O&M share are now found to be negative and statistically significant at the federal level. 
In fact, the marginal effects are close and slightly higher relatively to those obtained by the 
linear regressions. In contrast, the marginal effects for capital and O&M expenditures in the 
case of states and localities are found to be significantly positive and again close to those 
obtained  from  the  linear  regressions.  These  results  suggest  that  for  the  period  under 
                                                                                                                                                         
regressions, but they turned out statistically insignificant.   13 
consideration U.S. productivity growth would benefit (a) from a ceteris paribus fall in federal 
government’s total spending on infrastructure and from a rise in total expenditures by states 
and localities, and (b) from a rise in capital expenditures (or, equivalently, from a fall of 
spending on O&M) by the federal government. 
These  results  naturally  raise  the  question  whether  a  reallocation  of  infrastructure 
spending  between  the  federal  government  and  states  and  localities  would  have  been 
desirable. Hulten and Schwab (1997) have linked the possibility of state and local under-
spending on infrastructure with the presence of spillover benefits from one jurisdiction into 
another:  “In  cases  where  these spillovers  are  significant,  it is quite  possible  that state  and local 
governments will under-invest in infrastructure because they fail to recognize benefits realized by 
people who live elsewhere.” Indeed, Bania et al. (2007) have found that the average state under-
invests in productive expenditures, and Cohen and Paul (2004) have found that significant 
beneficial  productive  effects  exist  from  interstate  spillovers  of  public  infrastructure.  We 
investigate these issues in the next subsection 
 
4.2. Testing the fiscal decentralization hypothesis 
The "fiscal decentralization hypothesis" involves the devolution of responsibilities for public 
spending and revenue collection from the central to lower levels of government. Focusing on 
the expenditure side, the main theoretical prediction is that decentralization of spending 
increases efficiency and promotes economic development because local governments have 
better local information and hence can better match policies with the citizens’ preferences 
(Samuelson, 1954; Oates, 1972, 1993). The literature has emphasized that decentralization of 
fiscal expenditures may increase the efficiency of local public good delivery, particularly in 
large  countries  in  which  local  governments  are  in  a  better  position  than  the  central   14 
government to assess local preferences. 
Our  approach  is  similar  in  spirit  to  that  of  Xie  et  al.  (1999),  who  have  introduced 
theoretically public spending by different government levels in the production function. The 
authors  have  shown  in  a  time-series  framework  that  the  spending  shares  by  states  and 
localities were consistent with growth maximization over the period 1948-1994 and have 
claimed  that  any  reallocation  between  government  levels  might  harm  U.S.  growth.  We 
follow Xie et al. (1999) and include as a main variable in our regressions the share of state 
and local spending in total government’s capital and O&M expenditures in order to test the 
fiscal decentralization hypothesis. A rise in state and local governments’ share indicates a 
higher degree of fiscal decentralization.13 We also run the regressions with the state and local 
shares  in  the  capital  and O&M  components  of  total  government  spending to  reveal any 
differential impacts between them. 
Table 5 displays the estimation results for the impact of expenditure decentralization, in 
the context of infrastructure, on future U.S. private productivity growth. Consistent with our 
previous evidence, we find a positive and statistically significant impact of this share on both 
measures of future productivity growth utilized here. Moreover, examining separately the 
state and local shares for capital and O&M expenditures, we find that the impact of capital 
spending  by  states  and  localities  is  insignificant,  whereas  there  is  O&M  spending  has  a 
positive  and  statistically  significant  effect.  Importantly,  these  results  hold  irrespective  of 
whether state and local spending is measured net of federal grants or not (see last row of 
Table 5).14 These findings imply that decentralization of infrastructure spending, and mainly 
                                                 
13 Since spending shares for the federal government and states and localities add up to unity, the state 
and local share is only included in the regressions. 
14  When  expenditure  by  lower-levels  government  is  partly  financed  by  grants  from  higher-levels 
government,  the  share  of  expenditure  in  the  total  budget  does  not  necessarily  reflect  the  level  of   15 
of its O&M component, contributes to future productivity growth.  
These results suggest that a rise in the share of state and local expenditures as well as a 
reallocation of O&M spending towards states and localities would positively affect future 
productivity growth. This may well indicate that infrastructure’s maintenance is mainly a 
local  task  due  to  greater  efficiency  in  identifying  and  dealing  with  maintenance 
requirements. Hulten and Schwab (1997) have also stressed that the federal government has 
always been more willing to subsidize public capital expenditures than expenditures for 
maintenance  and  have  suggested  that  the  political  economy  literature  might  offer  some 
insights  into  this;  for  instance,  according  to  Tullock  (1983),  given  imperfect  information, 
politicians will choose methods of redistribution (e.g. transfer wealth to road builders and 
bus manufacturers) that are difficult to detect, even if they are inefficient. Finally, a possible 
explanation for the observed contrast with the current results of Xie et al. (1999) is that the 
authors  consider  total  spending  and  do  not  focus  on  ‘productive’  expenditures  like 
infrastructure spending. 
 
5. Transportation sectoral analysis 
In this section we focus on the role of the transport sector, since it has been one of the largest 
areas  of  public-sector  investment  and  its  good  condition  is  considered  to  be  crucial  in 
enhancing productivity.15 For instance, highways and roads, which in their vast majority are 
                                                                                                                                                         
authority  allocated  to  a  lower-level  government  because,  to  some  extent,  its  grant  relates  to 
expenditure authorized by a higher-level government. As Oates (1972) suggests, when the grantor 
directs in some detail the purposes for which the funds are to be used, the grants should be attributed 
to the level of government that collects the revenues. By contrast, lump-sum or unconditional grants 
should be attributed to the level of government that undertakes the expenditure. 
15 ASCE (2009) reports that poor road conditions cost U.S. motorists $67 billion a year in repairs and 
operating costs, while limited capacity causes Americans to spend 4.2 billion hours a year stuck in 
traffic at a cost of $78.2 billion a year to the economy. In a similar vein, a report by the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (2009) states that extra vehicle operating   16 
state or locally owned, are seen as the quintessential transportation infrastructure and have 
been studied extensively in the literature (see e.g. Chandra and Thompson, 2000; Cohen and 
Paul, 2004; Fraumeni, 2009). As shown in Table 1, irrespective of government level, the GDP 
share of spending on transportation has been more than double compared with spending on 
water infrastructure. Using a more detailed breakdown, CBO (2007) reports that the bulk of 
federal outlays has been dominated by capital spending on highways and roads (60 percent 
of total), whereas those for O&M have been concentrated on aviation. While federal O&M 
spending on highways and roads is relatively small, both capital and O&M expenditures on 
highways and roads comprise the largest share of spending for states and localities.16  
The upper panel of Table 6 displays the summarized evidence on the marginal non-
linear effects of federal and state and local spending on transportation infrastructure. Highly-
significant effects for both variables of interest are obtained and are again of opposite sign 
with respect to the two government levels: negative in the case of federal expenditures and 
positive in the case of state and local expenditures.  
The  lower  panel  of Table  6  presents  the  corresponding  effects  for the transportation 
infrastructure  components.  The  basic  result  on  the  negative  marginal  effects  of  federal 
spending is further clarified here, as additional expenditures by the federal government on 
mass transit, rail and aviation would exert a negative effect on future private productivity 
growth. Also, the negative marginal effect of the O&M share seems to be mainly driven by 
                                                                                                                                                         
costs due to rough roads in urban areas can be, for the average driver, as high as $746 annually, 
whereas every $1 spent in maintaining the good condition of a road precludes spending $6-$14 to 
rebuild one that has deteriorated. Mattoon (2004) corroborates these assessments by stating that the 
return  on  maintenance  of  U.S.  highways  was  as  high  as  35  percent,  while  the  return  on  related 
investments was just 5 percent. 
16 Contrary to federal infrastructure spending series, data are not available for state and local spending 
on water resources and freight rail (passenger rail spending is combined with expenditures on mass 
transit). Notice also that state and local spending on infrastructure is net of federal grants and loan 
subsidies, which are included in federal spending and comprise its largest portion.   17 
the mass transit component. The main finding obtained in the case of spending by states and 
localities  relates  to  the  positive  impact  of  spending  on  highways  and  roads,  and  the 
associated O&M share, which form their largest spending category. The policy conclusion 
derived from the estimated positive marginal effects is that expenditures on highways and 
roads should increase and be directed towards O&M. However, given the partial nature of 
our findings we delegate this issue to future research. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The present paper aimed at extending the empirical literature on the impact of productive 
government spending by identifying the attractive, yet unresolved, role of various types of 
public  infrastructure  expenditures  in  U.S.  productivity  growth.  The  primary  question 
formulated was twofold: what have been the impacts of capital and O&M outlays on U.S. 
private productivity growth and to what extent can these effects be attributed to different 
government levels? According to our findings, a reduction of federal infrastructure spending 
or  a  rise  of  state  and  local  expenditures  ("decentralization  of  infrastructure  spending"), 
mainly in the form of additional O&M outlays in the transport sector, would enhance future 
private  productivity  growth.  The  evidence  presented  here  therefore  contributes  to  the 
literature on the U.S. productivity - infrastructure link by showing that the impacts differ 
substantially by level of government and, consequently, this distinction should be taken into 
consideration in future studies. An additional by-product of our study is therefore that the 
functional classification of public outlays into capital and O&M matters for the assessment of 
their effects.  
The paper thus hopefully makes a persuasive case for some strong policy implications 
for  infrastructure  expenditures  in  the  context  of  private  productivity.  As  already   18 
emphasized,  many  recent  policy  reports  have  thoroughly  acknowledged  the  need  for 
increased public spending to upgrade America’s infrastructure system, which is believed to 
play  a  key  role  in  the  nation’s  economic  performance.  In  this  direction,  the  American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is expected to provide an important funding boost in 
some  areas,  although  a  number  of  systemic  challenges,  such  as  under-investment, 
inadequate revenue, and strategic planning and coordination, should still be addressed. Our 
study confirms some of these challenges by, for instance, providing evidence of state and 
local  under-spending  during  the  period  under  consideration.  Also,  in  light  of  the  tight 
budgetary constraints often faced by the authorities under fiscal distress, especially during 
periods of economic crisis like the current one, the relative impacts of federal and regional 
spending for infrastructure capital and related O&M presented here can provide a useful 
operational  policy  guideline  for  the  efficient  management  of  these  resources  at  the 
macroeconomic level. 
Finally, our results open some new avenues for further research in the area. Further 
work could certainly focus on regional aspects. Several types of infrastructure projects often 
involve small-scale interventions (like O&M outlays for public schools or hospitals) that are 
largely effective at the local level, but whose impact may not appear equally powerful at the 
national level. On the other hand, state and local O&M expenditures on transportation could 
have network benefits that are possibly stronger nationwide than at the regional level. It 
would  therefore  be  of  interest  to  policymakers  to  know  if,  and  in  which  sectors,  O&M 
activities  affect  primarily  the  local  economy  or  display  out-of-state  spillover  effects  on 
productivity.  Also,  this  study  has  not  examined  the  role  of  granting  tax  credits  and 
exemptions  to  state  and  local  governments,  typically  used  by  the  federal  government  to 
encourage  investment  in  infrastructure.  During  the  period  examined,  the  tax  law  has   19 
substantially  supported  spending  on  public  capital  by  excluding,  for  instance,  from  the 
taxable income the interest paid on bonds issued by states and localities for infrastructure 
financing,  thus  reducing  their  effective  interest  rate  (see  Hulten  and  Schwab,  1997). 
However, similar tax incentives have not been adopted for financing infrastructure’s O&M 
through bonds. Future research could therefore investigate the extent to which the existing 
tax incentives have shifted the allocation of resources away from O&M spending and the 
implications for productivity growth.   20 
Data Appendix 
For a description and details on the source of the main variables on public spending, see 
Section 2. The following variables were used in the estimated regressions. 
Growth  of  Output  per  Hour:  output  measured  net  of  price  change  and  inter-industry 
transactions  and  compared  to  labor  input,  measured  as  hours  at  work  (source: 
http://www.bls.gov/lpc/tfp.php). 
Growth of Multifactor Productivity: output measured net of price changes and inter-industry 
transactions, with the input measured as an aggregate of hours at work and capital service 
flows  to  account  for  the  role  of  capital  growth  in  output  growth  (source: 
http://www.bls.gov/mfp). 
Technology Index: Business sector TFP, given by output growth less the contribution of capital 
and  labor,  and  the  utilization  of  capital  and  labor  following Basu  et  al.  (2006)  estimates 
(source: http://www.frbsf.org/csip/tfp.php). 
Revenues: Budget of the U.S. Government, Historical Tables, Section 15.1 (source: 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy12/hist.html). 
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TABLE 1.  
Basic statistics of capital and O&M expenditures on public infrastructure: US, 1956-2004. 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
Capital and O&M expenditures (% of GDP)  2.6  0.2  2.3  3.1 
O&M expenditures (% of capital and O&M expenditures)  48.8  7.2  36.9  57.0 
Capital and O&M expenditures on transport (% of GDP)  1.8  0.2  1.6  2.2 
O&M expenditures on transport (% of capital and O&M 
expenditures on transport) 
47.9  6.7  35.7  56.0 
Capital and O&M expenditures on water (% of GDP)  0.8  0.1  0.7  0.9 
O&M expenditures on water (% of capital and O&M 
expenditures on water) 
50.9  9.3  37.2  65.0 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Capital and O&M expenditures (% of GDP)  0.7  0.2  0.4  1.0 
O&M expenditures (% of capital and O&M expenditures)  25.0  3.8  16.8  33.3 
Capital and O&M expenditures on transport (% of GDP)  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.7 
O&M expenditures on transport (% of capital and O&M 
expenditures on transport) 
23.8  6.0  11.9  39.0 
Capital and O&M expenditures on water (% of GDP)  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4 
O&M expenditures on water (% of capital and O&M 
expenditures on water) 
30.0  10.1  16.2  59.0 
STATES AND LOCALITIES 
Capital and O&M expenditures (% of GDP)  1.9  0.2  1.5  2.3 
O&M expenditures (% of capital and O&M expenditures)  58.4  8.9  41.1  69.6 
Capital and O&M expenditures on transport (% of GDP)  1.3  0.2  1.0  1.7 
O&M expenditures on transport (% of capital and O&M 
expenditures on transport) 
58.1  8.7  40.5  70.2 
Capital and O&M expenditures on water (% of GDP)  0.6  0.1  0.5  0.7 
O&M expenditures on water (% of capital and O&M 
expenditures on water) 
59.0  9.7  42.6  71.6 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2007) and authors’ calculations.  
Note: Data series on federal expenditures extend to 2006. 
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TABLE 2.  
Cross correlations of total capital and O&M expenditures (% of GDP) and O&M share by government level: US, 1956-2004. 
       
  Capital and O&M 
expenditures 
(total) 
Capital and O&M 
expenditures 
(federal) 












Capital and O&M expenditures (total)  1.00           
Capital and O&M expenditures (federal)  0.63  1.00         
Capital and O&M expenditures (S&L)  0.62  - 0.21  1.00       
O&M expenditures (total)  -0.89  -0.40  -0.71  1.00     
O&M expenditures (federal)  -0.65  -0.21  -0.61  0.69  1.00   
O&M expenditures (S&L)  -0.79  -0.17  -0.83  0.96  0.63  1.00 
 
Note: Capital and O&M expenditures are expressed as % of GDP. O&M expenditures are expressed as a share of capital and O&M expenditures. S&L denotes spending by 
states and localities, respectively. See also Table 1.   26 
TABLE 3. 
Linear effects of government expenditures for infrastructure capital and O&M on future U.S. private productivity growth rate 
 
  Total Government   Federal Government  States & Localities 
Independent variable  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP 




    0.01 
(0.02) 
    0.01 
(0.02) 
     -0.16*** 
(0.04) 
     -0.15*** 
 (0.04) 
Technology index  -0.04** 
    (0.02) 
   -0.04* 
    (0.02) 
-0.04*** 
      (0.01) 
 -0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
     -0.03** 
     (0.01) 
 -0.03** 
(0.01) 
Revenues       0.42** 
   (0.17) 
 0.34** 
      (0.17) 
   0.45*** 
      (0.12) 
0.36*** 
(0.13) 
     0.49*** 
  (0.13) 
    0.38*** 
 (0.12) 
Capital and O&M expenditures  -0.49 
  (1.38) 
      0.61 
   (1.34) 
 -2.28*** 
    (0.68) 
-1.85*** 
(0.67) 
   4.69*** 
   (1.23) 
   4.64*** 
    (1.08) 
O&M share  -0.01 
     (0.06) 
     0.01 




   (0.03) 
  0.04 
     (0.03) 
0.04  
     (0.03) 
R2-adjusted  0.23  0.31  0.57  0.55  0.56  0.62 
Observations  46  46  46  46  46  46 
 
Notes: 
a) The dependent variable is a five-year forward moving average of the measure of private productivity growth. O.p.H. and MFP 
denote the growth rates of Output per Hour and Multifactor Productivity respectively, as provided by the BLS. See Data Appendix 
for the list of explanatory variables. ‘Capital and O&M expenditures’ is expressed as GDP percent and ‘O&M share’ denotes the 
share of O&M spending in total (i.e. capital and O&M) expenditures). 
b) Estimation method is GMM with correction for fourth-order autocorrelation. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **   and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   27 
TABLE 4. 
Non-linear effects of government expenditures for infrastructure capital and O&M on future U.S. private productivity growth 
 
  Total Government  Federal Government  States & Localities 
Independent variable  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP 
Constant        0.65*** 
(0.11) 
    0.54*** 
       (0.16) 
    0.10*** 
      (0.03) 
    0.06 
      (0.04) 
-0.18 
       (0.12) 
  -0.32*** 
  (0.12) 
Technology index     -0.03*** 
    (0.01) 
   -0.03*** 
    (0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
      -0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
       -0.03** 
       (0.01) 
 -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Revenues     0.48*** 
    (0.08) 
0.38*** 
(0.02) 
    0.44*** 
      (0.09) 
       0.36*** 
      (0.10) 
   0.51*** 
    (0.12) 
   0.41*** 
(0.11) 
Capital and O&M expenditures     -29.38*** 
    (11.44) 
   -27.72* 









(Capital and O&M expenditures)^2     560.45*** 
  (209.80) 
   538.01* 









O&M share     -1.32*** 
     (0.33) 
-0.98** 
(0.45) 
      -0.92*** 
   (0.22) 
   -0.77*** 





(O&M share)^2      1.35*** 
     (0.35) 
 1.01** 
(0.47) 
      1.69*** 
  (0.45) 
    1.41*** 





R2-adjusted  0.76  0.69  0.66  0.63  0.58  0.64 
Observations  46  46  46  46  46  46 
Marginal effects 
Capital and O&M expenditures  Zero  Zero  -2.66***  -2.29***  4.36***      5.05*** 
O&M share  Zero  Zero  -0.07***  -0.06**  Zero  0.06* 
 
Notes: The statistical tests marginal effects are estimated from a Wald statistic based on the partial derivatives (see Section 3 in text). See 
Table 3 for further details.   28 
TABLE 5.  
Effects of decentralization of capital and O&M spending on future U.S. private productivity growth 
 
  Federal Grants Excluded from S&L Spending  Federal Grants Included in S&L Spending 
Independent variable  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP 




  -0.17*** 
 (0.03) 
   -0.13*** 
 (0.03) 








Technology index  -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.05** 
     (0.01) 
    -0.05*** 
     (0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
  -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
    (0.01) 
    -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Revenues    0.40*** 
(0.14) 
0.31** 
     (0.14) 
   0.55*** 
  (0.11) 
0.41*** 
(0.12) 








S&L share of capital and O&M expenditures     0.07*** 
(0.02) 
  0.06*** 
   (0.02) 
-  - 
  0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.20*** 
   (0.06) 
-  - 




-  -       0.01 
(0.06) 
     0.04 
     (0.07) 
S&L share of O&M expenditures   -  - 
   0.17*** 
(0.04) 
  0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-  - 
   0.16*** 
(0.04) 
      0.12*** 
     (0.04) 
R2-adjusted  0.50  0.47  0.63  0.58  0.56  0.54  0.60  0.54 
Observations  46  46  46  46  46  46  46  46 
 
Notes: ‘S&L share of capital and O&M expenditures’, ‘S&L share of capital expenditures’, and ‘S&L share of O&M expenditures’ respectively denote the fraction of 
capital and O&M spending, of capital spending, and of O&M spending by total government that are conducted by states and localities. See Table 3 for further details.   29 
TABLE 6.  
Summarized marginal effects of government expenditures for transport capital and O&M 
 on future U.S. private productivity growth 
 
  FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  STATES AND LOCALITIES 
Independent variable  O.p.H.  MFP  O.p.H.  MFP 
Transport (Aggregated) 
Capital and O&M expenditures  -2.01**  -2.42**  7.83***  10.96*** 
O&M share    -0.09***    -0.08***  0.09*  0.14*** 
Transport (Disaggregated) 
Highways and Roads 
Capital and O&M expenditures  Zero  Zero  Zero  6.58*** 
O&M share  Zero  Zero  Zero  0.14*** 
Mass Transit 
Capital and O&M expenditures     -31.75***  Zero  Zero  12.74 
O&M share  0.01***  Zero  Zero  Zero 
Rail 
Capital and O&M expenditures  Zero  -31.26**  n.a.  n.a. 
O&M share  Zero  Zero  n.a.  n.a. 
Aviation 
Capital and O&M expenditures    -15.49*  Zero  Zero  Zero 
O&M share  Zero  Zero  Zero  Zero 
 
Notes: n.a. denotes non-available data. The non-linear effects are estimated from a regression including a constant, 
the technology index, and tax revenues as % share of GDP. See Table 4 for further details. 
 